On-the-job search and strategic bargaining [An article from: European Economic Review]

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On-the-job search and strategic bargaining [An article from: European Economic Review]

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On-the-job search and strategic bargaining [An article from: European Economic Review] Product Description
This digital document is a journal article from European Economic Review, published by Elsevier in 2006. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

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This paper studies wage bargaining in a simple economy in which both employed and unemployed workers search for better jobs. The axiomatic Nash bargaining solution and standard strategic bargaining solutions are inapplicable because the set of feasible payoffs is nonconvex. I instead develop a strategic model of wage bargaining between a single worker and firm that is applicable to such an environment. I show that if workers and firms are homogeneous, there are market equilibria with a continuous wage distribution in which identical firms bargain to different wages, each of which is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game. If firms are heterogeneous, I characterize market equilibria in which more productive firms pay higher wages. I compare the quantitative predictions of this model with Burdett and Mortensen's [1998. Wage differentials, employer size and unemployment. International Economic Review 39, 257-273.] wage posting model and argue that the bargaining model is theoretically more appealing along important dimensions.




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On-the-job search and strategic bargaining [An article from: European Economic Review]

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